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Abstract
We propose and estimate a dynamic model of voting with asymmetric information
incorporating the three main factors aﬀecting voting choices of individual citizens:
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level data on voting decisions in two consecutive presidential elections, we identify and
estimate (1) the distribution of voters’ policy positions and (2) candidates’ valence. In
addition to providing an equilibrium interpretation of the observed voting proﬁles and
electoral outcomes, we use the estimated model to conduct counterfactual experiments
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information on the outcomes of elections and to evaluate the performance of the
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In representative democracies, where elected politicians make policy-relevant decisions
on behalf of their constituents, voting is one of the main ways citizens participate in
the political process. Citizens’ voting choices determine who is elected, therefore may
contain important information on citizens’ political preferences.
T h ef a c tt h a tm o s te l e c t i o n st a k ep l a c er epeatedly over time suggests us that
having observations on how the same individuals vote in consecutive elections provides
a variation in voting data that, in addition to the cross-sectional variation, may be
particularly useful to identify and estimate citizens’ policy preferences as well as other
unobservable objects of interest.
The following observations emerge from voting data from two consecutive U.S.
presidential elections. First, we observe all possible voting proﬁles: individuals who
vote for the democratic or republican candidate in both elections and individuals who
vote for the democratic candidate in the ﬁrst election and for the republican candidate
in the second election or vice versa. Second,“voting persistence” and “switching
behavior” are both quantitatively signiﬁcant phenomena: while a large majority of
voters, around 80 percent, vote for the same party’s candidate in two consecutive
elections, the remaining 20 percent vote for candidates of diﬀerent parties in two
consecutive elections. Third, voting patterns diﬀer by party identiﬁcation: voters
who identify with a particular party are more likely to vote for that party’s candidate,
but the extent of “party loyalty” and switching behavior varies across parties.
Many researchers in political science have focused on characterizing the main
determinants of voting.1 The consensus view is that voting choices of individual cit-
izens are typically aﬀected by three factors: party identiﬁcation (that is, a voter’s
attachment to a particular party), policy preferences, and candidates’ valence (that
is, candidates’ personal characteristics about which everybody has the same pref-
1See, e.g., Campbell et al. (1960), RePass (1971), Jackson (1975), Jones and Page (1979), and
Markus and Converse (1979).
2erence such as honesty, charisma, integrity, trustworthiness, or leadership). While
voters will in general diﬀer with respect to their policy and party preferences, they
will, by deﬁnition of valence, agree that candidates with relatively higher valence are
preferable.2
In this paper we propose and estimate a dynamic model of voting with asymmet-
ric information incorporating the three aspects of individual voting behavior. Using
individual-level data on voting decisions in two consecutive presidential elections, we
identify and estimate (1) the distribution of voters’ policy positions and (2) candi-
dates’ valence. In addition to providing an equilibrium interpretation of the observed
voting proﬁles and electoral outcomes, we use the estimated model to conduct counter-
factual experiments to assess the relative importance of candidates’ policy positions,
valence, and voters’ information on the outcomes of elections and to evaluate the
performance of the electoral process.
We consider a two-period model of voting where in each period there are two can-
didates running for the presidency. Each candidate has an exogenous policy position
and valence which are both constant over time. The incumbent (that is, the candi-
date who wins the election in the ﬁrst period) runs for reelection in the second period
and faces a new challenger. There is a continuum of voters who care about both the
policy position and valence of the winning candidate in each election. While voters
observe candidates’ policy positions they do not observe their valence. Voters are
heterogeneous with respect to their demographic characteristics, party identiﬁcation,
information status, and policy preferences.
Party identiﬁcation enters our model in two diﬀerent ways. First, we allow the
distribution of voters’ policy positions to diﬀer by party identiﬁcation. Second, we
assume that party identiﬁcation impacts access to information, in particular, voters
2For example, according to Hinich (1982b) valence includes characteristics beyond a candidate’s
immediate control that are unrelated to policy and aﬀect voters’ evaluations of candidates. See also
Stokes (1963, 1992), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000). Our deﬁnition of valence does not include a
candidate’s ability to implement speciﬁc policies, in which case voters may disagree that candidates
with relatively higher valence are preferable.
3with diﬀerent party identiﬁcations may receive diﬀerent signals on candidates’ valence.
The model has a unique equilibrium with sincere voting. The equilibrium strategy
prescribes a diﬀerent voting behavior for each possible combination of candidates’
valence in the two elections and implies a probability distribution over voting choices
in the two periods. The equilibrium electoral outcome depends on candidates’ policy
positions and valence, voters’ preferences, and the degree of asymmetric information,
and it reveals information on the candidates’ valence.
We structurally estimate our model using individual-level voting choices in the
1968 and 1972 U.S. presidential elections from the 1972 Center for Political Studies
survey data. The estimates of the model allow us to quantify the eﬀect of individ-
ual characteristics on voters’ policy preferences and provide insight on the relation
between demographics, party identiﬁcation, and political views of American citizens.
For example, we ﬁnd that some characteristics have a similar eﬀect on voters’ pol-
icy preferences regardless of their party identiﬁcation (e.g., blacks are more liberal
than non-blacks), whereas other characteristics aﬀect voters’ policy preferences dif-
ferently depending on their party identiﬁcation (e.g., while more educated Democrats
are relatively more liberal, more educated Republicans tend to be relatively more
conservative). Our results suggest the importance of breaking down the aggregate
relationship between demographics and policy preferences by considering their inter-
action with party identiﬁcation.
Our estimates of the valence of the presidential candidates in 1968 and 1972 indi-
cate that Humphrey (the democratic candidate in 1968) had high valence, McGovern
(the democratic candidate in 1972) had low valence, and Nixon (the republican can-
didate in 1968 and again, as incumbent President, in 1972) also had low valence. This
result is perhaps surprising given that Nixon won the 1968 election by a very small
margin and then won again 1972 by a margin as large as that gained by Johnson
in 1964 or Roosevelt in 1936. However, the results are consistent with anecdotal
accounts of the events surrounding the 1968 and 1972 elections.
4The two main counterfactual experiments allow us to assess the eﬀect of primaries
elections and information on electoral outcomes. The ﬁndings can be summarized
as follows. First, while in 1968 none of the democratic candidates participating in
the democratic presidential primaries could have defeated Nixon, virtually all the
participants in the 1972 democratic primaries (other than McGovern) could have
won the presidency. Second, had all voters been aware that Nixon was a low-valence
candidate, Humphrey would have been elected President in 1968.
Before turning our attention to the description of the model, we will brieﬂyd i s c u s s
the relationship of our work to the existing literature. First, most of the existing em-
pirical literature on voting estimates voters’ policy preferences using data on individ-
ual self-reported attitudes towards policies and candidates (see, e.g., Cahoon, Hinich
and Ordeshook 1978; Rabinowitz 1978; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Poole and Rosen-
thal 1984; Brady 1990; and Poole 1998). In contrast to these studies, we estimate the
distribution of voters’ policy preferences using their observed voting behavior, given
their individual characteristics. Our approach relies on a revealed preference argu-
ment that identiﬁes fundamental utility parameters from observed optimal choices.
In this respect it is analogous to the approach used by Heckman and Snyder (1997),
Poole and Rosenthal (1997), Londregan (2000), and Bailey (2001) to estimate legis-
lators’ policy preferences from observed roll call voting.3 Since one may argue that
self-reported measures of “proximity” to a particular policy or candidate are subject
to the so called “projection” and “persuasion” bias (see, e.g., Markus and Converse
1979), and are not interpersonally comparable (see, e.g., Brady 1989), instead of us-
ing this information as an input in the estimation we use it to externally validate our
empirical results.
Second, most of the previous empirical analyses of voting focus on single elections
and abstract from the estimation of candidates’ valence (see, e.g., Cahoon, Hinich,
and Ordeshook 1978; Rabinowitz 1978; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Poole and Rosenthal
3Lewis (2001) estimates the distribution of voters’ ideal points using individual-level voting re-
turns on ballot propositions.
51984; Brady 1990; and Poole 1998).4 An important innovation of our analysis is that
by using the additional information contained in the sequence of voting choices by
the same individuals in two consecutive elections, we can simultaneously estimate the
distribution of voters’ policy preferences and candidates’ valence. The three main
features of the data allowing us to separately identify these two objects are: the
variation in the data generated by repeated voting; the fact that diﬀerent individuals
face the same candidates in each election; and the fact that the candidate who wins
the ﬁrst election also runs for oﬃce in the second election.
While in this paper we focus on the 1968-72 elections, our methodological approach
is quite general and can be used to address a variety of issues emerging from voting
data from multiple elections (both elections for the same public oﬃce over time and
concurrent elections for diﬀerent public oﬃces).
In section 2 we describe the model, in section 3 we describe the equilibrium, in
section 4 we discuss the modeling assumptions, in section 5 we describe the empirical
analysis, in section 6 we conduct counterfactual experiments, and in section 7 we
conclude.
2T h e M o d e l
T h e r ea r et w op e r i o d s ,1a n d2 .I ne a c hp e r i o dt h e r ea r et w oc a n d i d a t e sr u n n i n gf o r
President, D and R,w h e r eD denotes the democratic candidate and R the republican
candidate. Each candidate c ∈ {D,R} is characterized by a one-dimensional policy
position yc ∈ [−1,1], yD <y R,a n dv a l e n c exc ∈ {L,H}, L<H ,where the policy
space [−1,1] is the traditional liberal-conservative space and L and H denote low and
high valence respectively. Both yc and xc are exogenously given and ﬁxed. In period
4Sachar (2000) uses data on repeated voting to estimate a model of habit persistence. Cahoon,
Hinich, and Ordeshook (1978), and Enelow-Hinich (1984) correct their estimation procedure to
account for valence, but they do not estimate valence simultaneously with voters’ ideal points.
Brady (1990) proposes a method to estimate a general ideal-points model that allows him to jointly
estimate the distribution of voters’ ideal points and that part of the average evaluation of candidates
unrelated to the spatial dimension.
62 the incumbent President (that is, the candidate who wins the election in period 1)
runs for reelection and faces a new challenger.
There is a continuum of voters distributed in the interval [−1,1]. We index each
voter by j. Voters observe the candidates’ policy positions, but they do not observe
their valence. However, voters know the distribution of valence in the population of
potential candidates, and we let q ∈ (0,1) be the probability that a candidate has
high valence.5
Each voter j has exogenous demographic characteristics Wj ∈ W,w h e r eW is
the space of demographic characteristics. In addition to diﬀering with respect to
their demographic characteristics, voters are heterogeneous along three dimensions
which we label as party identiﬁcation, information status, and policy preferences.6
Each voter j has an exogenous party identiﬁcation, kj ∈ K = {d,r,i}. Speciﬁcally,
when a voter has a democratic party identiﬁcation, kj = d, it means he considers
himself a Democrat; when a voter has a republican party identiﬁcation, kj = r, it
means he considers himself a Republican; and when a voter has an independent party
identiﬁcation, kj = i, it means he does not feel attached to any particular party,
or, equivalently, he considers himself an Independent. We will alternatively say that
voter j has party identiﬁcation k or that voter j’s group is k, where k denotes an
element of K. The proportion of voters belonging to k is nk (nk ∈ [0,1],
P
k∈{d,r,i}
nk =1 ) .
Party identiﬁcation aﬀects access to information. Each voter j from group k
has a probability mk of becoming informed and a probability (1 − mk)o fr e m a i n i n g
uninformed. We let Ij ∈ {0,1} denote voter j’s information status, where Ij takes
the value 1 when the voter becomes informed and 0 when he remains uninformed.
Information status is ﬁxed during the two periods: that is, if a voter is informed
5In this paper we abstract from political competition and assume that voters condition their
voting choices on the candidates’ policy positions. Typically candidates for the presidency have
served in either the House of Representatives or the Senate. Estimation of legislators’ policy positions
are available in the data. See section 5.
6Although party identiﬁcation is exogenous in our model, because of its particular role in the
model we do not classify it among the other individual characteristics.
7in period 1 he will also be informed in period 2. Informed voters receive a signal
about candidates’ valence in each period. Party identiﬁcation aﬀects not only the
probability of becoming informed but also the type of information received. Let
Sk denote the signal space for a voter from group k in each period, and let st
0 and
st
k denote the signal received at time t by an uninformed and an informed voter
from group k respectively. We assume that an uninformed voter, regardless of his
party identiﬁcation, does not receive any signal, st
0 = {0,0};a ni n f o r m e dv o t e rw i t h
a democratic party identiﬁcation receives a perfect signal about D’s valence, st
d =
{xt
D,0}; an informed voter with a republican party identiﬁcation receives a perfect
signal about R’s valence, st
r = {0,x t
R}; and an informed voter with an independent





The idea that party identiﬁcation works as an information selection device is not
completely new.7 For example, Fiorina (1981, p.81) writes, “All individuals do not
receive random samples of political information. One’s party identiﬁcation is no
doubt associated with these kind of diﬀerences in receipt of information.” We model
the idea that voters with diﬀerent party identiﬁcations have asymmetric political
information by assuming that people who feel attached to a party are more likely to
be informed about that party’s candidate.8 For tractability of the model we assume
that party identiﬁcation is exogenous, and in addition we assume that it is ﬁxed.9
These assumptions can be partially justiﬁed by the fact that we restrict our analysis
to short-term dynamics.10
7See, e.g., Campbell et al. (1960), RePass (1971), Fiorina (1977, 1981), and Franklin and Jackson
(1983).
8This assumption can be justiﬁed on the grounds that, typically, individuals with a partisan
party identiﬁcation go to their party’s conventions, they read partisan newspapers, and they are
more likely to have friends of the same party with whom they discuss their party’s candidates.
9In our dataset party identiﬁcation is measured only once. See section 5.1.
10Party identiﬁcation is supposed to capture a long term attachment to a party. According to the
view of the earliest “Michigan School” (Campbell et al., 1960), party identiﬁcation is strictly related
to individual socio-demographic characteristics. More recently, Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers (1999)
ﬁnd that party identiﬁcation and, more generally, individual political preferences are mainly aﬀected
by political socialization within the family. We are aware that party identiﬁcation is also subject to
8Each voter j has a preferred policy position or ideal point yj,w h i c ht a k e sv a l u ei n
the interval [−1,1]. We can characterize the distribution of policy positions of voters
from group k by the function Yk(·|W) with domain [−1,1]. The assumption that
the distribution of voters’ ideal points has full support regardless of party identiﬁ-
cation is justiﬁed by evidence that voters’ self-placement along a liberal-conservative
scale is distributed on the full support of such a scale irrespective of voters’ party
identiﬁcation.11
Voter j’s utility in period t when candidate c is elected depends on both the
distance between his ideal point yj and the candidate’s policy position yt







c − (yj − yt
c)2
where λ is the relative weight that all voters assign to valence.





R}) and candidates’ distribution of valence in the population (q),
voters know the signals’ structure, the distribution of voters across party identiﬁca-
tions, and the group speciﬁc distribution of ideal points (that is, they know mk, s1
k(.),
s2
k(.), nk,Y k(.), ∀k ∈ K).
We abstract from abstention and we assume that all citizens vote sincerely in each
period: given their party identiﬁcation, information status, ideal point, signal, the two
candidates’ policy positions, and their beliefs about candidates’ valence, citizens vote
for the candidate who, if elected, gives them the highest expected utility. As a tie-
breaking rule we assume that when a voter is indiﬀerent between the two candidates
he votes for each of them with equal probability.
short-term variations and that even its long-term component changes over time (especially in the
years covered by our analysis). However, Green (1990) has shown that once measurement errors are
taken into account, party identiﬁcation appears to be very stable. He also suggests that “it may be
au s e f u ls i m p l i ﬁcation to regard party identiﬁcation as exogenous with respect to variables such as
voting behavior, candidate evaluations, issues proximity, and retrospective performance evaluation.”
11See footnote 50 for self-reported placement on a ﬁxed-point liberal-conserative scale from the
1972 CPS survey and the summer 1969 Gallup opinion polls.
9We can summarize the timing of the events as follows. Voters’ party identiﬁcation
and information status are known before the beginning of period 1. At the beginning
of period 1, all voters observe the identity of the two competing candidates (that is,
who is R and who is D) and their policy positions; in addition, the informed voters
receive a signal about the two candidates’ valence. During period 1 they vote, and
at the end of the same period they observe the outcome of the election.12 Voters
do not directly observe the winner’s valence, but they update their beliefs using the
information contained in period 1’s electoral outcome and signal.13 At the beginning
of period 2 voters observe the identity of the new challenger and his policy position.
In addition, the informed voters receive another signal on the candidates’ valence.14
During period 2 all voters vote, and at the end they observe the outcome of the second
election.
3 Strategies and Equilibrium
A voting strategy for voter j with party identiﬁcation kj = k and ideal point yj is
ap a i ro fv o t i n gr u l e s( v1
jk,v 2
jk) which assign to voter j the candidate to vote for in
each period. The voting rule in each period t is a mapping from the set of relevant
information about candidates for voters from group k in period t, Ωt
k, to the set of
voting choices {D,R}. T h ev o t i n gr u l ei np e r i o d1i sv1
jk : Ω1
k −→ {D,R} and the
voting rule in period 2 is v2
jk : Ω2
k −→ {D,R},w h e r eΩ1
k = Sk ×{ 0,1}×[−1,1]2,
Ω2
k = {Sk}2 ×{ 0,1}×[−1,1]2 × [−1,1]2 × Π1
D,a n dΠ1
D ⊆ [0,1] is the set of period
1’s vote shares for candidate D.15 We denote by ωt
jk ∈ Ωt
k the information about
12T h ev o t es h a r ei sas u ﬃcient statistic for the electoral outcome.
13If instead we assume that voters do not know the distribution of policy preferences in the
population but can observe the winning candidate’s valence through his behavior while in oﬃce, as
it will be clear after reading section 3, the equilibrium voting behavior for each state of the world
wouldn’t be aﬀected.
14The signal is redundant for the informed voters of the same party as the incumbent.
15In period 1 a voter’s information about the candidates is given by his signal in period 1, his
information status, and the observed policy positi o n so ft h et w oc a n d i a t e si np e r i o d1 .I np e r i o d2
a voters’ information about the candidates is given by his signals in both periods, his information
status, the candidates’ policy positions in both periods, and period 1’s vote share.
























R)2]d e n o t e
the diﬀerence in voter j’s utility when candidate R is elected rather than candidate D,
and let {Pk,I} denote the beliefs system about the distribution of candidates’ valence
of a voter from group k and information status I .
Proposition 1: The unique equilibrium strategy with sincere voting {(v1∗
jk,v2∗
jk)}k={d,r,i}
is characterized as follows. For any voter j with party identiﬁcation k ∈ K and with






















































where the expectation is taken with respect to the system of beliefs {Pk,I} which is
calculated using Bayes Rule.
The proof is trivial and follows directly from sincere voting. Although voters are
sincere and myopic, the two elections are linked by the eﬀect of the aggregate outcome
on beliefs and the fact that the incumbent’s type and policy position as well as voter’s
information status are constant over time.
Notice that even though the equilibrium strategy is unique, an individual’s actual
voting choice depends on the realized information status and on which of the ﬁnite
and discrete combinations of candidates’ valence is realized. Let X = {HHHH,
HHHL, HHLH, HLHH, HLHL, HLLL, LHLL, LHLH, LHHH, LLLL, LLLH,




R} as its generic
element. The result of proposition 1, together with the assumptions that the utility
is quadratic with respect to the diﬀerence in policy positions and that candidates’
11valence follows a Bernoulli distribution, can be used to derive a simpler and more
useful characterization of the equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 2: (i) The equilibrium strategy prescribes a cut-oﬀ voting rule in each
period t. For any voter j, party identiﬁcation k, ideal point yj, information on
candidates ωt
jk ∈ Ωt
k, there is a unique cut-oﬀ point in each period t, yt(ωt
jk) such
that: if yj < yt(.) it is optimal to vote for D, if yj > yt(.) it is optimal to vote for
R, if yj = yt(.) the voter is indiﬀerent and will vote for D(R) with probability 1
2.









jk] is the expected diﬀerence in valence between candidate R and





2 is the “midpoint” of the two candidates’ policy positions; and
gt =2 ( yt
R −yt
D) is the “gap” between the two candidates’ policy positions in period t.
Proof: Voter j0s optimal strategy is to vote for R(D)i fEuj > 0(< 0). Voter j will
vote for R(D)i fλ∆t
j +[(yj −yt
D)2−(yj −yt
R)2] > 0( < 0). Solving for j’s ideal point,










We use proposition 2 to analyze the possible voting proﬁles that emerge in equi-
librium. Let V = {RR,RD,DR,DD} be the set of dynamic optimal voting proﬁles,
where RR denotes the proﬁle of a voter who votes for the republican candidate in
two consecutive elections, RD denotes the proﬁle of a voter who votes for the re-
publican candidate in period 1 and for the democratic candidate in period 2, and so
on. Proposition 2 tells us that if a voter’s ideal point in any period is to the left of
his cut-oﬀ point, he will vote for D, a n di fi ti st ot h er i g h to fh i sc u t - o ﬀ point, he
will vote for R. It follows that a voter’s dynamic voting choice is determined by the
locations of his cut-oﬀ points in the two periods and their relationship with respect
to his ideal point. Let ytk and yt0 be the cut-oﬀ points at time t for an informed voter
from group k and for an uninformed voter respectively.16 Take an informed voter j
16The cut-oﬀ points of informed voters are independent of their party identiﬁcation.
12with party identiﬁcation k and ideal point yj. When y2k <y j <y 1k his voting proﬁle
will be DR, when y1k <y j <y 2k his voting proﬁle will be RD (ﬁgure 1). Analogously,
the uninformed voter will generate the proﬁle DR when y20 <y j <y 10 and RD when
y10 <y j <y 20.
Figure 1. Cut-oﬀ points and voting proﬁles: informed voters from group k
 
DD DR RR 
-1 1 y2k  y1k 
DD RD RR 
-1 1 y1k  y2k 
A ﬁrst observation is that only the elements which enter in the expression for the
cut-oﬀ points are relevant to the equilibrium strategy. Voter j’s cut-oﬀ points depend
on the candidates’ policy positions and on his information (both the one contained
in his signals and in period 10s electoral outcome). In each period t,a n yc u t - o ﬀ point
can be expressed simply as a combination of the midpoint, mt;t h eg a p ,gt;a n dt h e
weighted expected diﬀerence in valence, λ∆t
j. For any information status and signal
it is easy to show that λ∆t
j is a linear function of λ(H − L) only. This implies that
the weight on valence λ and the perceived maximum diﬀerence in valence (H − L)
never enter separately in the equilibrium characterization.
A second observation is that the model puts restrictions on which state is po-
tentially compatible with the observed voting patterns. For example, if the cut-oﬀ
points related to a particular state and candidates’ positions are such that, for some
k, y1k >y 2k and y10 >y 20, then we can conclude that such a state is incompatible
with observing all the voting proﬁles within group k. This is because voters in group
k would only generate the proﬁles DD,DR, and RR.17 In general, to generate both
17This situation occurs for example when y1
D >y 2
D, and candidate R is the winner of the ﬁrst
election (which corresponds to having m1 >m 2 and g1 <g 2). In this case the observed voting proﬁles
would be incompatible with a state where all candidates have a high valence (state HHHH), and
13switching patterns (DR and RD) within each group, we need the cut-oﬀ points of
informed and uninformed voters to be such to generate diﬀerent switching behaviors
( t h a ti s ,i tm u s tb et h a te i t h e ry2k <y 1k and y20 >y 10 or y2k >y 1k and y20 <y 10,
∀k).18 Proposition 2 also allows us to derive the following result about electoral
outcomes.
Proposition 3: In equilibrium π1
D completely reveals the valence of period 1’s can-
didates.
The intuition is that for any possible state, the equilibrium vote share is uniquely
determined by the fraction of voters with diﬀerent party identiﬁcations, their prob-
ability of being informed, and the distribution of policy positions. Voters know nd,
nr,n i, md,m r,m i, Yd,Y r,Y i and the signal structure. Since by assumption in any
group k at each policy point with positive mass there is a fraction of voters mk that
becomes informed, voters can perfectly calculate the vote share corresponding to any
realization of the two candidates’ valence in period 1. Such shares will be diﬀerent for
any valence pair, so by observing π1
D voters know both candidates’ valence.19
A corollary to proposition 3 is that π1
D completely reveals the valence of the
incumbent. That the outcome of the ﬁrst period’s election reveals the valence of the
incumbent is what makes the model an equilibrium model instead of just a simple
individual decision making problem. As a consequence, some voters - the ones that
in the ﬁrst period do not receive a signal on the valence of the candidate that will
win the election - in equilibrium will use the information contained in the electoral
this incompatibility would arise from the behavior of Independents. Speciﬁcally, the cut-oﬀ points of
an informed Independent would be y1i = m1 and y2i = m2, while the cut-oﬀ points of an uninformed
Independent would be y10 = m1 and y20 = m2 − z
2g2. Since y1i >y 2i and y10 >y 20, Independents
in equilibrium will not generate RD.
18The reader can ﬁnd in Degan (2003) the details about which states are compatible with diﬀerent
conﬁgurations (that is, pair of candidates’ policy positions in the two periods and identity of the
incumbent), observing all four voting proﬁles, and the corresponding cut-oﬀ points.
19For the proof see Appendix A. There is a particular combination of parameters where uninformed
voters cannot distinguish among states where in period 1 both candidates have either a low or a
high valence.
14outcome and, more in general, all voters in period 2 will condition their voting choices
on the incumbent’s valence.
4 Discussion of Modeling Choices
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two key features emerging from voting
data from two consecutive elections.20 First and most importantly, we observe all four
voting proﬁles (DD, DR, RD, and RR) both at the aggregate level and within each
group k and each proﬁle constitutes a statistically signiﬁcant phenomenon. Second,
the four voting proﬁles are heterogeneous across groups, that is, the frequency of each
proﬁle changes with party identiﬁcation. Before turning to the empirical analysis,
we would like to discuss the role of our modeling assumptions in the production of
equilibrium predictions coherent with such features.
We show that, within our framework, each element of the model (the policy di-
mension, the valence dimension, asymmetric information, and party identiﬁcation)
is necessary for this purpose. Indeed, whenever we drop any of these elements the
model becomes inconsistent with the data.
When voters do not care about policies, their heterogeneity is due only to diﬀer-
ences in information. In this case the model generates too little variation in dynamic
voting behavior because everyone with the same information votes the same way. For
any state of the world there is at least one group of voters - those belonging to the
party whose candidate will become incumbent in period 2 - who can generate at most
t w ov o t i n gp r o ﬁles (DD and RD or DR and RR).21 The informed voters of such a
group can only generate one voting proﬁle, either DD or RR,w h i l et h eu n i n f o r m e d
voters can only generate two voting proﬁles, either DD and RD (when the informed
20Notice that although our analysis focuses on two particular consecutive elections such features
emerge in all consecutive presidential elections.
21A secondary consequence of this case is that there is complete double switching after the period
1’s valence LL. In this case all informed voters from group d vote R, and the informed voters from
group r vote D.
15generate DD)o rDR and RR (when the informed generate RR).22
When voters do not care about valence (λ = 0), we go back to the standard one-
dimensional spatial model of voting, where voting behavior is driven only by policy
concerns. In particular, when −(yj − yt
D)2 > −(yj − yt
R)2 the voter votes for D;
when −(yj − yt
D)2 < −(yj − yt
R)2 he votes for R; he randomizes with probability
(1
2, 1
2) otherwise. The preferences over the policy space are single-peaked, and the
winner in each election is the candidate preferred by the voter with the median policy
position.23 With no utility for valence, party identiﬁcation loses its informational role
because there is no relevant information to be conveyed. In terms of voting patterns,
the model generates diﬀerent voting proﬁl e sw i t h i ne a c hp a r t yi d e n t i ﬁcation only
because policy preferences are heterogeneous within each group. However, any kind
of switching behavior is unidirectional. When candidate D is the incumbent and
candidate R in period 2 has a policy position to the left (right) of candidate R0si n
period 1, the model will only generate DD,RR,DR (DD,RR,RD)b e c a u s ep e r i o d
2’s cut-oﬀ point is smaller (greater) than period 1’s.
A distinctive feature of our model is that diﬀerent switching patterns within k
can only be generated by voters with diﬀerent information. If we eliminate asym-
metric information within a group - that is, if all the voters in group k are either
informed or uninformed - the model can only generate three out of four voting pro-
ﬁles (DD,RR,RD or DD,RR,DR)w i t h i ne a c hg r o u p .
When we drop party identiﬁcation - that is, when we assume that there is a
common probability of becoming informed across groups (mk = m, ∀k), that all
t h ei n f o r m e dr e c e i v et h es a m es i g n a l( st
k = st, ∀k,t), and that all voters are drawn
from the same distribution of policy positions (Yk = Y, ∀k)-w ec a n n o te x p l a i nt h e
diﬀerences in voting patterns across groups.24
22See Degan (2003) for the details.
23The median is taken with respect to the aggregate distribution of policy positions.
24In the context of our model we could explain the diﬀerence in voting patterns across groups only
if voters sort into party identiﬁcation groups based on their individual characteristics and if these
have have diﬀerent eﬀects on voters’ policy posisitions. However, although in the data there is some
sorting among party identiﬁcations based on individual characteristics (e.g., race), it is not extreme
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5.1 Data
We focus our attention on the 1968 and 1972 U.S. presidential elections.25 In 1968,
consistent with our model, there are two new candidates running for oﬃce: Hubert
Humphrey and Richard Nixon. Humphrey, a Senator from Minnesota since 1949
and Vice-President since 1964, is the candidate for the democratic party. Nixon, a
Senator from California from 1951 to 1953, Vice-President from 1953 to 1960, and an
unsuccessful presidential candidate in 1960, is the candidate for the republican party.26
In 1968 Nixon wins the election with 43.42% of the popular vote to Humphrey’s
42.72%.27 In 1972 Nixon runs as an incumbent against the democratic candidate
George McGovern, a Senator from South Dakota since 1962 and chairman of the
Reform Commission of the Democratic Party. In 1972 Nixon wins the election by a
great margin, gaining 60.69% of the popular vote to McGovern’s 37.53%, and then
resigns in 1974 after Watergate.28
For the purpose of our empirical analysis we need variables for voters’ party iden-
tiﬁcations, their voting choices, their demographic characteristics, and candidates’
positions. We take these variables from two sources of data. The ﬁrst is the 1972
Center for Political Studies (later National Election Studies) data. The second is the
DW-NOMINATE legislators’ coordinates data.29
The 1972 CPS dataset is particularly appropriate for the estimation of our model
enough to justify diﬀerences in policy positions across party identiﬁcations.
25There are two main reasons why we concentrate on two periods. First, we have data on indi-
viduals’ repeated voting, of a reasonable sample size, for only two consecutive elections. Second,
the assumption that both party identiﬁcation and voters’ preferences are constant over time can be
justiﬁed only over a short period of time.
26Although Nixon run for President in 1960, he disappeared from the political scene from 1962
until his candidancy in 1968.
27In 1968 George Wallace, a third candidate, receives 13.53% of the popular vote, and other minor
candidates receive the remaining 0.33%. We focus only on the two major parties’ candidates. We
will discuss the robustness of our results to this restriction in section 5.5.
28In 1972 there is not a major third candidate running for the presidency, and minor candidates
receive the remaining 1.78% of the popular vote.
29See Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 1999) and McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997.
17for several reasons. It is an individual-level dataset containing observations on voting
choices in 1968 and 1972.30 It has two diﬀerent half samples, each representative
of the cross-section voting age population in 1972, which can be used to test the
performance of the model out of sample. It contains data on individuals’ socio-
demographic characteristics and party identiﬁcation.31
In all CPS/NES studies respondents are asked the following question: “Generally
speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Independent, Democrat,
or what?” We use such a 3-point categorization as a measure of party identiﬁcation.32
We use a dummy variable in each election, R68 and R72, which takes the value one if
the respondent voted for the republican candidate and zero if the respondent voted for
the democratic candidate. Analogously, we use dummy variables, RR,RD,DR,DD,
for the respondents’ two-period voting proﬁles. We use a dummy variable, BLACK,
which takes the value one if the respondent is black and a dummy variable, FEMALE,
which takes the value one if the respondent is a female. To capture the eﬀect of
diﬀerent regions we use a dummy variable, SOUTH, for the solid south.33 We use
two dummies for education level: EDUH for education levels strictly lower than a
high school degree and EDUC for education levels greater than or equal to a college
degree.34 We use AGE as a continuous scaled variable for the respondent’s age and a
30Wright (1993) analyzes the problem of measurement errors in vote choices in NES survey data.
Our data on voting choices in 1968 come from retrospective voting questions. We are aware of
measurement errors related to recall questions. To have an idea of the magnitude of misreporting in
our context, we looked at the 1972-76 panel data and compared the data about the 1972 presidential
vote from the 1972 post-election wave to the data from the 1976 pre-election wave. In our selected
sample only 7% of respondents reported unconsistent voting choices in the two waves. Himmelweit,
Biberman, and Stockdale (1978) analyze the vote bias in recalls.
31Each survey contains a pre-election and a post-election wave. Both questions on party identi-
ﬁcation and retrospective voting are asked in the pre-election wave. This reduces the problem of
ex-post rationalization.
32There is also a party identiﬁcation variable which uses a 7-point categorization and takes into
consideration the strength of party identiﬁcation. We choose the 3-point categorization ﬁrst of all
because our model doesn’t incorporate the strength of party aﬃliation, and second because our
measure is more stable over time. Our qualitatively results do not change if we treat Independent
l i n e r sa sp a r t i s a n s .
33The states included in the solid south are: Alabama, Virginia, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississipi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas.
34The excluded category includes high school degree and some college.
18dummy variable, MINCOME, for income levels greater than the median.35
From the original data set, containing 2705 observations, we select respondents
who voted either for a republican or democratic candidate in both 1968 and 1972 and
for whom we have data on demographic characteristics and party identiﬁcation.36 The
resulting sample contains 1083 observations.37 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics
of the selected sample from the ﬁrst source of data.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variables All r d i
R68 655 344 111 200
R72 716 339 117 200
RR 584 330 91 163
RD 71 14 20 37
DR 132 9 86 37
DD 296 7 231 58
BLACK 97 5 76 16
EDUH 346 104 181 61
EDUC 213 90 54 69
SOUTH 195 43 113 39
FEMALE 585 201 245 139
AGE∗ 240 104 92 44
MINCOME 615 222 214 179
TOT 1083 360 428 295
∗We include in the cell Age the number of respondent 62 or older
The DW-NOMINATE is a dynamic model that estimates, separately for the House
of Representatives and the Senate, legislators’ coordinates on a two-dimensional pol-
icy space using legislators’ roll call voting choices throughout their career.38 Similarly,
the coordinates of Presidents are estimated using their support roll calls.39 The ﬁrst
35In diﬀerent versions of the model we have excluded age and/or income. The main results of our
analysis were uneﬀected.
36To evaluate the robustness of our estimates with keeping only individuals who voted in both
elections, we performed out-of-sample predictions on those that voted in only one election (see
section 5.5).
37See Appendix B for further details on the dataset.
38One empirical reason we do not include Wallace in our analysis is that he has not been a member
of Congress, hence we do not have a measure of his policy position.
39Notice that even if the President does not vote, “Presumably, if the President were able to vote,
he would vote in the direction indicated in the support calls.” Poole and Rosenthal (1999, p.9).
19dimension of the DW-NOMINATE coordinates has been interpreted as the traditional
liberal-conservative dimension. Therefore, we use the ﬁrst dimension of the NOMI-
NATE estimates as a measure of candidates’ positions on a liberal-conservative scale.
In particular, we use the “constant model” version of DW-NOMINATE, where can-
didates’ coordinates are constrained to remain constant over the candidate’s whole
career.40
There are two main reasons why such measures of candidates’ coordinates are
particularly appealing. First, they are restricted to lie within the interval [−1,1].
Second, the fact that legislators are constrained to have a constant position allows us
to compare coordinates of the elected Presidents with those of their challengers who
typically served in Congress in diﬀerent years. Table 2 reports the coordinates, on
the liberal-conservative dimension, of the presidential candidates considered in our
study.41
Table 2. Presidential candidates’ coordinates
Candidates Humphrey H McGovern G Nixon R
coordinate: -.34 -.467 .451
5.2 Estimation Procedure
In the model voters know their own ideal points but the econometrician doesn’t. We
are interested in the link between demographic characteristics and policy preferences
for each group of voters. Here we choose a particular functional form for the dis-
tribution of ideal points Yk.S p e c i ﬁcally, we assume that yj is drawn from a beta
distribution with support [−1,1] and parameters (pkj,h).42 We parametrize the ﬁrst
parameter of such distribution to j’s party identiﬁcation and demographic charac-
teristics (BLACK, EDUH, EDUC, SOUTH, FEMALE, AGE, MINCOME), and we
40The DW-NOMINATE “constant model” coordinates were available on-line at
htpp://voteview.uh.edu.
41To provide a term of comparison, we can, for example, give the coordinates of Presidents Carter
and Reagan, which are - .364 and .608 respectively.
42We choose the beta distribution because it is the most ﬂexible distribution, and it is deﬁned on
a ﬁnite support.
20restrict the second parameter to be the same both within and across groups. Since
the coeﬃcients of a beta distribution must be strictly positive, pkj > 0a n dh>0,
our parametrization becomes
pkj =e x p ( βkWj)
h =e x p ( α)
where βk and α a r ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r st ob ee s t i m a t e d .
It is useful to remember that candidates’ positions are exogenous parameters avail-
able in the data and that for any candidates’ positions pair and state of the world,
the unique equilibrium with sincere voting induces a diﬀerent voting behavior. Notice
that we cannot estimate valence directly because diﬀerent candidates’ valence lead
to diﬀerent equilibrium voting behaviors, and consequently, to diﬀerent conditions on
the parameters we want to estimate. However, since for any state of the world there is
a unique equilibrium voting behavior and we observe an ex-post voting behavior, we
can estimate the parameters of the model by maximum likelihood conditional on each
state. We then pick as an estimate of valence the state whose equilibrium maximum
likelihood is the highest, indicating that the observed voting proﬁle was more likely
under that state.
For reasons that will be explained in the next paragraph, we let z = λ(H−L). For





of ideal points Bkj(·), we can derive the likelihood of the observed voting proﬁle Vj




R)a s : 43
L(Vj|βk,α,m k,z,q,y,W j,k,x)=
R 1
−1 L(Vj|βk,α,m k,z,q,y,W j,k,x,y u)bkj(yu)dyu
We ﬁx q to 0.5, which is equivalent to an uninformative prior, and we estimate βk,
α, md,m r,m i,a n dz conditional on the state x.44 The parameter z is a composite
43We use bkj to indicate the density function of the policy position of voter j with characteristics
Wj belonging to group k as a short form for b(pkj,h). We do analogously with the cdf.
44In section 5.4 we discuss the robustness of our results to both the assumption on the second
parameter of the beta and on the probability of being high valence.
21parameter. As we mentioned in section 3, it is impossible to separately identify
the weight λ and the perceived maximum possible diﬀerence in candidates’ valence
(H − L), an element independent of the realized valence. A large value of z may be
due to voters placing a high weight on valence or to a great potential diﬀerence in
candidates’ valence.45
For any two consecutive elections, where in the ﬁrst period there are two new
challengers and in the second period the incumbent runs for reelection, there are
potentially eight states to consider. However, as mentioned in section 3, the model
puts restrictions on which states are compatible with the observed voting proﬁles and
candidates’ conﬁguration. Using the NOMINATE coordinates from table 2, it is easy
to verify that the midpoints and gaps in the two periods are such that m1 >m 2
and g1 <g 2. The conﬁgurations in 1968 and 1972, together with the fact that we
observe all four voting proﬁles within each group, allow us to exclude states HHHH,
HHLH, LLHL, LLLL,a n dLHLH because the derived equilibrium voting proﬁles
are incompatible with the data.46 We can therefore restrict our attention to three
states: HLLL, LHHH, and HLHL. When we estimate the model by conditional
maximum likelihood for each of these states, we ﬁnd that the state corresponding to
the highest likelihood is HLLL.47
45We could ﬁxe i t h e rλ or (H−L) to some arbitrary value, but since these two concepts are related
a n dw ea r en o ti n t e r e s t e di nt h ee s t i m a t i o no fλ and (H −L) per se, we prefer not to take any stand
on their value and estimate instead the composite parameter z.
46In states HHHH and HHLH, Independents and Democrats cannot generate the proﬁle RD
because for any value of z>0, the corresponding cut-oﬀ points of the informed and uninformed in
period 1 are greater than the ones in period 2 (y1i >y 2i,y 1d >y 2d and y10 >y 20). In states LLHL
and LLLL, Democrats cannot generate the proﬁle DR because the conditions on z needed to have
y1a >y 2a and y10 <y 20 (the only characterization of cut-oﬀ points compatible with the proﬁles of
Independents and Republicans) are incompatible. In state LHLH Democrats could generate RD
only for values of q that, even if allowed, would impose conditions on z incompatible with the other
groups’ voting proﬁles.
47Each case requires diﬀerent restrictions on z in order to generate cut-oﬀ points compatible with
the four voting proﬁles. Based on likelihood criteria, given a likelihood at convergence of -885.49 for
the state HLLL, we could exclude LHHH (with a likelihood at convergence of -896.85) and HLHL
(with a likelihood smaller than -1,000). We also compared the goodness-of-ﬁt tests of the model
estimated conditional on each of the three states. While when the state is HLLL the estimated
model passes the standard Pearson’s Chi-Square test on static and dynamic voting proﬁles both at
the aggregate level and by party identiﬁcation (see section 5.4), it doesn’t pass the test on some or
22When the state is HLLL, in equilibrium the informed voters generate the proﬁles
DD, DR, RR and the uninformed voters the proﬁles DD, RD, RR. The conditional
likelihood function of voting proﬁle Vj of voter j from group k is:
L(Vj|βk,α,m k,z,y,W j,k,HLLL)=
R 1
−1[mkI(yu <y 2k)+( 1− mk)I(yu <y 10)]DDj · [mkI(y2k <y u <y 1k)]DRj·
[(1−mk)I(y10 <y u <y 20)]RDj ·[mkI(yu >y 1k)+(1−mk)I(yu >y 20)]RRj ·bkj(yu)dyu
where y1k, y2k, y10,y 20 are the cut-oﬀ points corresponding to state HLLL and DDj,
DRj,R D j, and RRj are dummy variables for individual j’s voting proﬁle. Using the
cdf of the beta distribution B(·), the likelihood can be rewritten as:
L(Vj|βk,α,m k,z,y,W j,k,HLLL)=
[mkBkj(y2k)+( 1− mk)Bkj(y10)]DDj · [mkBkj((y1k) − Bkj(y2k))]DRj·
[(1 − mk)(Bkj(y20) − Bkj(y10))]RDj · [mk(1 − Bkj(y1k)) + (1 − mk)(1 − Bkj(y20))]RRj
The total loglikelihood of j’s voting proﬁle unconditional on his party identiﬁcation
can be easily derived as:
l(Vj|βd,βr,βi,α,m d,m r,m i,z,y,W j,HLLL)=
P
j[ln(L(Vj|βd,α,m d,z,y,W j,d,HLLL)) · pidDj+
ln(L(Vj|βr,α,m r,z,y,W j,r,HLLL)) · pidRj+
ln(L(Vj|βi,α,m i,z,y,W j,i,HLLL)) · pidIj]
where pidRj,pidI j,pidD j are dummies for j’s party identiﬁcation.
5.3 Estimation Results
The estimated values of βd,β r,a n dβi (table 3) characterize the distribution of voters’
policy positions.48 To interpret the coeﬃcients on demographic characteristics note
all the voting proﬁles when state LHHH and HLHL are considered respectively.
48The covariance matrix of the parameters is calculated as the inverse of the numerical Hessian.
For a complete characterization of the estimated distribution of voters’ policy positions, we also need
t h ee s t i m a t eo fα and the derived value of h (table 4).
23that a bigger value of any coeﬃcient corresponds to a bigger pkj whose eﬀect is to
move the mass of the beta distribution to the right. It follows that the higher the
coeﬃcient on any individual characteristic the more conservative voters with such a
characteristic tend to be.49
Table 3. Estimated parameters: policy positions
Variable Estimate St.err. t-stat.
Democrats
CONST 1.423 0.724 1.966
BLACK -1.098 0.417 -2.634
EDUH 0.020 0.095 0.212
EDUC -0.428 0.195 -2.199
SOUTH 0.448 0.155 2.898
FEMALE -0.022 0.081 -0.275
MINCOME 0.223 0.112 1.987
AGE 0.005 0.033 0.151
Republicans
CONST 2.542 0.436 5.833
BLACK -0.701 0.339 -2.067
EDUH -0.238 0.123 -1.938
EDUC -0.006 0.095 -0.066
SOUTH 0.002 0.066 0.029
FEMALE -0.153 0.100 -1.531
MINCOME 0.096 0.095 0.972
AGE 0.061 0.034 1.792
Independents
CONST 2.338 0.480 4.866
BLACK -1.201 0.446 -2.695
EDUH 0.085 0.119 0.715
EDUC -0.334 0.139 -2.396
SOUTH 0.281 0.161 1.743
FEMALE -0.236 0.107 -2.199
MINCOME -0.024 0.091 -0.265
AGE 0.002 0.029 0.066
The results on policy preferences are the following. There are some characteristics
that aﬀect voters’ policy preferences similarly regardless of their party identiﬁcation
and other characteristics whose eﬀects diﬀer with party identiﬁcation. BLACK has
49This is true when we make the comparison for ﬁxed h.
24a notable (negative) eﬀect on all groups. SOUTH has a very strong (positive) eﬀect
on Democrats and an almost signiﬁcant eﬀect on Independents, while it is has no
eﬀect on Republicans. EDUC has a signiﬁcant (negative) eﬀect on Democrats and
Independents, while EDUH has a signiﬁcant (negative) eﬀect on Republicans. This
means that among Democrats and Independents the most educated voters are more
liberal than their less educated counterparts, while among Republicans the opposite is
true, that is, the least educated are more liberal. FEMALE is (negatively) signiﬁcant
only among Independents and slightly signiﬁcant among Republicans. AGE does not
help to explain policy preferences. MINCOME has a relatively signiﬁcant eﬀect only
on Democrats.
Interestingly, despite the high correlation between income level and education,
income level has a separate and opposite eﬀect from education. While Democrats
with a high education are more liberal, those with the highest income level are more
conservative. Note also that none of the individual characteristics are very signiﬁcant
among Republicans, probably due to the small number of observations with any proﬁle
other than RR.
A complementary way to analyze policy preferences is to look at the plots, both
at the aggregate level and by party identiﬁcation, of the estimated marginal distribu-
tions of voters’ ideal points by characteristics (ﬁgures 1.1-1.26 in Appendix C ). All
the marginal distributions are in line with the above results. Blacks are more liberal
than non-blacks both in the aggregate (ﬁgure 1.1) and within each party identiﬁcation
(ﬁgures 1.7, 1.13, and 1.19). Southerners are more conservative than non-southerners
(ﬁgure 1.3). However, this eﬀect is very signiﬁcant for Democrats, less so for Indepen-
dents, and not signiﬁcant at all for Republicans (ﬁgures 1.9, 1.21, and 1.15). This
result is consistent with the division that was occurring during those years between
southern and northern Democrats and with the known fact that southerners were
generally more conservative than northerners. Although at the aggregate level highly
educated voters are more conservative than their less educated counterparts (ﬁgure
251.2), education has diﬀerent eﬀects across party identiﬁcations (ﬁgures 1.8, 1.14, and
1.20). Even though women are more liberal than men among both Republicans and
Independents (ﬁgures 1.16 and 1.22), the eﬀect of gender disappears in the aggregate
(ﬁgure 1.4). As expected from the point estimates, Democrats with an income level
lower than the median are more liberal than those with higher income levels (ﬁgure
1.11). Age doesn’t have a separate eﬀect on policy preferences. However, Indepen-
dents older than 62 appear to be more conservative than young Independents.
The above results on the estimated policy preferences lead us to the following
three observations. First, considering the relatively homogeneous demographic com-
position of diﬀerent groups, our results indicate that to understand the relationship
between demographics and policy preferences it is important to consider their in-
teraction with party identiﬁcation. Second, overall, Democrats’ policy preferences
are more heterogeneous than Independents’, which in turn are more heterogeneous
than Republicans’ (ﬁgure 1.25). Third, the aggregate distribution of ideal points is
relatively conservative (ﬁgure 1.26). Both last results are in accordance with the
self-reported liberal-conservative view of the population.50
It is important to point out that in our estimation we do not use any a priori infor-
mation on individuals’ political preferences (such as self-reported preferences towards
candidates, policies, or parties). Rather, in order to estimate voters’ preferences we
apply a revealed-preference approach which relies solely on observed individual vot-
ing choices, and we use individual self-reported preferences only to externally validate
our results. Yet, maybe surprisingly, most of the above results are in line with what
other political-sociological studies have said about political preferences of American
voters.51 In addition, our results allow us to disentangle the eﬀect that each charac-
50According to the self-reported positions on a 7-point liberal-conservative categorization from
the 1972 CPS data, 24% of respondents report to be liberal, 41% conservative, and the remaining
35% report to be middle-of-the-road; the corresponding proportions among Republicans are 9%,
60%, and 31%; among Democrats 33%, 26%, and 41%; and among Independents 29%, 37%, and
34%. In the summer 1969 Gallup opinion polls, 23% of respondents report to be conservative, 28%
moderately conservative, 18% moderately liberal, 15% liberal, and 15% don’t know.
51See, e.g., Miller and Shanks (1996) and Scammon and Wattenmberg (1971).
26teristic has on voters’ policy preferences and get further insight to the relationship
between demographics and political views of the American electorate.
The estimated voters’ probabilities of being informed (md,m r, and mi in table
4) indicate that Democrats and Republicans were more likely to be informed than
Independents (68%, 29%, and 18% probability respectively) and that Democrats were
more likely to be informed than both Republicans and Independents.52 As we would
expect if we assume that there is some cost of gathering information, we estimate that
even if Independents have richer information (they receive signals on both candidates),
they have a smaller probability of receiving such information compared to the other
groups.
Table 4. Estimated parameters (continued)







Our estimated state of the world is HLLL, meaning that we estimate Humphrey to
have high valence and McGovern and Nixon to have low valence. Most experts would
agree HLLL is an accurate reﬂection of the actual state. Humphrey did not win the
1968 presidential election, but he was highly respected and very experienced having
served in the Senate almost continuously from 1949 until he died in 1978. Scammon
and Wattenberg (1971, p.172) seem to be in perfect agreement with our ﬁndings
stating that Humphrey “. . . was perceived, ﬁnally, as hard-hitting, intelligent, and
f o r c e f u l ,a sw e l la san i c eg u y . ”
Nixon’s success was due mainly to the coupling of his relatively moderate economic
policy with his ability to deal with foreign aﬀairs; however, as Watergate revealed, he
52The parameters md,m r,m i,z,h are transformations of directly estimated parameters. Their
standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
27was not a trustworthy politician. Even before Watergate the wide use of impoundment
of funds, veto power, and administrative discretion, as well as the secret bombing of
Cambodia in 1969 may point to Nixon being a low-valence politician.53 More objective
evidence of Nixon’s low valence include his “dirty-tricks team,” an old institution in
American politics that was taken to new heights in 1972; and the “Plumbers,” an
apparatus originally organized to plug leaks that eventually expanded its activities
to include a variety of secret and illegal operations.54
George McGovern, a very liberal candidate not supported by mainstream Democrats,
easily won the democratic nomination basic a l l yb e c a u s eh ew a st h eo n l yc a n d i d a t el e f t
after Nixon’s negative campaign forced Muskie then Jackson and ﬁnally Humphrey
out of the race. The Eagleton case and the O’Brien case are only a few of the many
examples of McGovern’s inability to make clear decisions and to keep promises.55
Our ﬁndings on candidates’ valence imply that Nixon was elected President in 1968
even though he was a low-valence politician running against a high-valence challenger
(Humphrey). Even more interestingly is that the 1972 election was a landslide for
Nixon even though all voters knew of his low valence. Our estimated model provides
an equilibrium interpretation of such outcomes as well as of the observed group-
speciﬁc voting patterns.
According to our estimated model, the main factors allowing Nixon to win both
elections were a conservative constituency together with voters’ lack of information
in 1968 about his low valence, and having an extremely liberal and low-valence demo-
53The secret bombing of Cambodia doesn’t neccessarily indicate Nixon’s low valence, but it is one
example of Nixon’s tendency to take action in secrecy. Also, the frequent exercise of veto power and
impoundements of funds may indicate Nixon’s low valence to the extent to which they demonstrate
his inability to constructively negotiate with the Congress, a skill required of a good leader.
54Among the most famous episodes related to the “dirty-tricks team” and the “Plumbers”are:
the secret eﬀorts to discredit and defame Daniel Ellsberg (who published a top secret study on the
origin and conduct of the war in Vietnam in the New York Times); the fake cable created in an
attempt to link President J. Kennedy to the assassination of south Vietnam’s President; the illegal
money-collection during the 1972 campaign; and the predatory strategy of Nixon’s 1972 committee
for reelection, which attempted to sabotage the campaigns of the top democratic front-runners in
the hopes of forcing them out of the race and leaving a weak democratic opponent for the general
election.
55See, White (1973).
28cratic opponent in 1972.
Among Democrats, who we found to be relatively conservative, the informed who
voted for Humphrey in 1968 and switched to Nixon in 1972 (20%) were voters with a
moderate policy view who knew Humphrey had high valence and McGovern had both
low valence and an extremely liberal policy position. When faced with candidates with
equal valence (Nixon and McGovern), they preferred to vote for the more conservative
candidate (Nixon). The vote of informed Republicans and Independents with voting
proﬁle DR, who both knew Nixon had low valence, was driven mainly by policy
concerns in both periods. The uninformed voters who switched their vote from R to
D were slightly conservative voters that given their symmetric prior on valence, voted
for Nixon in 1968 driven by policy concerns.56 However, Nixon’s revealed low valence
turned their votes toward McGovern in 1972 despite his liberal policy position.
We can also explain why, although Nixon won in 1972 with a much greater margin
than in 1968, the proportion of Republicans who voted for Nixon in 1972 is smaller
than in 1968. In the ﬁrst election most Republicans were unaware of Nixon’s low
valence, and they voted for him based on policy considerations. In 1972 some of these
voters, after learning that Nixon had low valence, preferred to vote for McGovern
despite his extremely liberal policy position.
5.4 Goodness of Fit
To assess whether our model can reproduce the quantitative features of the data, we
need to compare the predicted voting proﬁles to the observed ones. We report the
actual and ﬁtted voting proﬁles at the aggregate level and by party identiﬁcation in
tables 5, 6, and 7. The “actual” column reports the frequency in the data (overall or
by party identiﬁcation) of each voting proﬁle. The “predicted” column reports the
estimated probability of each voting proﬁle, calculated by integrating the individual
probability of such a proﬁle over voters (overall or within a particular group).
56According to the candidates’ coordinates from table 2, middle-of-the road voters are closer to
Humprhey than to Nixon.








Table 6. Aggregate static voting proﬁles
1968 Actual Predicted 1972 Actual Predicted
D 39.52 39.56 D 33.89 33.93
R 60.48 60.44 R 66.11 66.07
X 2
(1) .0007 X 2
(1) .0007
Table 7. Dynamic voting proﬁles by party identiﬁcation
Proﬁles Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Party D Party D Party R Party R Party I Party I
DD 53.97 53.73 1.94 2.84 19.66 19.41
DR 20.09 20.43 2.50 1.78 12.54 12.59
RD 4.67 4.88 3.89 3.05 12.54 12.92
RR 21.26 20.97 91.67 92.32 55.25 55.08
X2
(3) .0828 2.900 .044
We perform standard goodness-of-ﬁt tests on both dynamic and static voting
proﬁles and report the relative Pearson’s Chi-Square test at the end of each table.57
Table 5 shows the results for the four dynamic voting proﬁles at the aggregate level.
The value of the test indicates that our model cannot be rejected by the data at
conventional signiﬁcance levels.
Table 6 shows the aggregate static voting patterns in 1968 and 1972. The model
predicts perfectly both electoral outcomes. In neither year can we reject our model.
Analogous results hold for the dynamic voting patterns within each party identiﬁca-
tion (table 7). The model captures both party loyalty and switching behavior, and
their diﬀerences across parties.
57The test on dynamic voting proﬁl e si saX 2 with three degress of freedom, while the test on the
static voting proﬁl e si saX 2 with one degree of freedom. The critical values at 5% are 7.81 and 3.84
respectively.
30An additional and complementary way to assess the ability of a model to gen-
erate predictions quantitatively coherent with empirical evidence is to verify how it
performs out of sample. We make two diﬀerent types of out-of-sample predictions.
First, we estimate the model on either one of the half samples of the original data
set and make out-of-sample predictions on the other half. Second, using the estimated
parameters from the original sample, we perform out-of-sample predictions on voting
behavior of voters in the 1968 and 1972 elections using data from a diﬀerent source,
the General Social Survey (GSS).
The reader can ﬁnd the results of these out-of-sample predictions in Appendix D.
The model performs relatively well on the half samples (tables D.1-D.6), predicting
the aggregate outcomes of the elections in 1968 and 1972 and the dynamic voting
patterns of Democrats and Republicans on both half samples. The model doesn’t
pass the goodness-of-ﬁt test on the dynamic voting proﬁl e so fI n d e p e n d e n t so n l yb ya
tiny margin. The imperfect prediction of the behavior of Independents prevents the
model from passing the test on the aggregate dynamic voting proﬁles.58
Our model performs very well on the GSS data (tables D.7-D.9). The estimated
model perfectly predicts the electoral outcomes in both 1968 and 1972, and it cannot
be rejected on either the aggregate or the group-speciﬁc dynamic voting proﬁles .59
5.5 Robustness
While in section 4 we discussed the elements of the model necessary to explain the
qualitative features of the data, here we discuss their importance to our empirical
analysis and the robustness of the results to some of the assumptions made in the
estimation. Some of these assumptions are necessary for identiﬁcation purposes,
others allows us to obtain a better ﬁt of the data or to improve the precision of the
estimates.
58The imperfect prediction is probably aﬀected by the small sample size of the two half samples
(577 and 506 observations respectively).
59It fails to pass the test for Independents by just a few decimal points.
31In our model, information status (that is, whether a voter receives a signal) is
assigned at the beginning of the ﬁrst period and remains constant thereafter. This is
a critical assumption allowing us to identify the probability of being informed. In fact,
we can identify md,m r,a n dmi because by holding the information status of each
voter ﬁxed, informed and uninformed voters generate opposite switching patterns.
We assumed that each policy position with positive mass has a corresponding
fraction of voters mk that becomes informed.60 This assumption on information status
is suﬃcient to guarantee that the aggregate vote share perfectly reveals information
on candidates’ valence. Moreover, because of this assumption, the aggregate voting
patterns put restrictions directly on the probability of being informed.
None of the assumptions on party identiﬁcation are necessary for identiﬁcation,
rather, they help to better explain the features of the data.61 It would be diﬃcult to
explain diﬀerences in dynamic voting patterns across parties without these assump-
tions. We estimated a model in which we completely eliminate the role of parties.
The model in which voters’ policy positions are drawn from a common distribution
(βk = β,∀k) and each voter has the same probability of becoming informed (mk = m,
∀k)a n dt h es a m es i g n a l( st
k = {xt
D,x t
R}, ∀k) is rejected by both the likelihood-ratio
test and the goodness-of-ﬁt test. The data reject a model in which party identiﬁcation
is not taken into account. We reach similar results even if we shut down each of the
ﬁrst two elements of party identiﬁcation (diﬀerent βk and mk)o n ea tat i m e . 62 On the
basis of the goodness-of-ﬁt test on dynamic voting proﬁles and on the likelihood-ratio
60The probability of being informed may be otherwise related to policy preferences or to observable
characteristics or may be just a random eﬀect.
61The assumptions we refer to are: the relationship between policy positions and party identiﬁ-
cation, the party speciﬁc probability of becoming informed, and the asymmetry in signals accross
parties.
62The assumption that individuals with a partisan party identiﬁcation receive only the signal about
their own party’s candidate implements the idea that citizens with a partisan party identiﬁcation are
more likely to receive information about their own party’s candidate. We cannot reject our model
speciﬁcation when we compare it with the model where all informed voters receive both signals
regardless of their party identiﬁcation. If we ﬁx z, we can also estimate a model where informed
partisans can receive a signal either on their own candidate or on both. We cannot reject the
hypothesis that partisans receive only one signal.
32t e s t ,w er e j e c tb o t ht h em o d e li nw h i c hp r eferences are constrained to be the same
across parties and the one in which there is a common probability of being informed.63
When we estimated the model with the probability that a candidate has high
valence (q) free, we obtained a point estimate of .53 (very close to our uninformative
prior). However, although the qualitative results did not change, the estimates of all
the other coeﬃcients became much less precise.64
In the speciﬁcation of the distribution of voters’ ideal points, we have parametrized
the ﬁrst parameter of the beta while we constrained the second parameter to a con-
stant common to all party identiﬁcation groups. The estimate of h is rather imprecise.
Although we restricted the second coeﬃcient of the beta not to be party speciﬁc, the
identiﬁcation of h separately from the constant terms in pkj is tenuous. In our context,
such identiﬁcation is complicated by the fact that we also estimate the parameter z,
which enters in the expression for the cut-oﬀ points. Some sort of restrictions are
necessary. We could have opted for diﬀerent parametrizations, but ours is probably
the most ﬂexible, since we want to allow both the mean and the variance to diﬀer
across party identiﬁcations. In addition, the restriction on h make the coeﬃcients on
individual characteristics for diﬀerent party identiﬁcation groups more comparable.
By abstracting from abstention, what we estimate is the distribution of policy
positions of citizens who go to vote. In fact, we have restricted the analysis to
citizens who voted in both 1968 and 1972 and who voted either for the republican or
the democratic candidate. However, we have conducted out-of-sample predictions on
voting choices of citizens that we observe voting only in 1968 or in 1972 (tables D.10
and D.11 in Appendix D) and the results suggest that our estimates are robust to
t h ee x c l u s i o nf r o mt h es a m p l eo fp e o p l ew h ov o t e di no n l yo n ee l e c t i o n . 65
63The loglikelihood of the model in which there is a unique distribution of policy preferences is
-1100.95, while in the model in which there is a common probability of becoming informed it is
-911.10.
64On the basis of likelihood-ratio test we couldn’t reject our restriction that q equals 0.5.
65Notice that the sample of 1968-only voters includes observations for which we have missing
values in 1972. The same is true for the sample of 1972-only voters, where the missing values in
1968 also include those that voted for Wallace.
33Similarly, to assess the robustness of our estimates to the abstraction from Wal-
lace’s candidacy in 1968 (in 1972 there was no relevant third party candidate), we
use our estimated model to predict how the voters who chose Wallace in 1968 voted
in 1972 (table D.12). It seems that our estimated model is able to predict how these
individuals voted in 1972.66 We are aware that this result is not suﬃcient to claim
that abstracting from a third party’s candidate does not bias our results. However, we
ﬁnd the results of this out-of-sample prediction (table D.12) comforting because they
indicate that the non-inclusion of Wallace does not aﬀect the ability of the estimated
model to predict individual voting behavior.67
6 Counterfactual Experiments
As pointed out in section 5.3, the estimated model tells us that Nixon wins the election
in 1968 even though he has low valence and faces a high-valence opponent. It also tells
us that Nixon is reelected in 1972 despite the fact that voters know he is a low-valence
politician. These outcomes arise from the combination of a conservative constituency,
the particular degree of asymmetric information about candidates’ valence, and the
trade-oﬀ between policy and valence in voters’ utility function. Since voters have
preferences over both candidates’ policy positions and their valence, based on these
ﬁndings alone we cannot draw any immediate conclusion on the relative desirability
of alternative electoral outcomes.
In this section we use our estimated model to conduct counterfactual experiments
allowing us to shed some light on the eﬃcacy of the electoral process in selecting the
“best” candidate and on the so called incumbency advantage.
We determine the most liberal policy position that would have allowed a high and
a low-valence democratic candidate to defeat Nixon in 1968 and in 1972. Then we
66We slightly underpredict the proportion of Democrats that voted for the republican candidate.
67It is not clear how we should modify the information structure to include a third candidate in
our model. Should Independents receive information only on the third party or on all candidates? In
addition, from a pratical point of view we cannot include Wallace in our empirical analysis because
we do not have a measure of his policy position.
34match this with the policy positions of the candidates participating in the democratic
primaries. We ﬁnd that in 1968 none of the existing candidates held such a policy
position.68 We obtain a diﬀe r e n tr e s u l ti n1 9 7 2 .W h i l eM c G o v e r nw o u l dh a v el o s tt h e
election even if he had a high valence, Humphrey and Muskie could both have defeated
Nixon provided that they had high valence.69 Additionally, there were two other
candidates, Jackson and Lindsay, that according to our model could have defeated
Nixon independently of their valence.70
This result is in line with the argument that after 1968 the eﬃcacy of the pri-
mary elections system in selecting the “best” candidate declined dramatically. The
McGovern-Fraser Commission introduced a reform to the democratic presidential
nominating process making the system more democratic since 1972. The commission
“recommended” adopting proportional representation in the allocation of delegates
for the various contenders based on the proportion of the popular vote they received
in the primary; it required, in convention and caucus states, that 75% of delegations
be chosen at district level; and it ﬁxed quotas to guarantee the representation of
minority groups at the national convention.71 From 1968 to 1972 the percentage of
delegates nominated through primaries went from 40% to more than 60%. From a
theoretical point of view, it is well known that plurality rule in an environment with
more than two candidates does not necessarily lead to the selection of the “best”
68Only a high-valence democratic candidate with a policy position greater than -.1349 could have
defeated Nixon in 1968. The main democratic candidates in 1968 were Johnson (who resigned),
Robert Kennedy (who was assassinated during the primaries), and McCarthy. Their policy positions
are respectively -.235, -.468, and -.369.
69In 1972 a high-valence candidate would have won the election had he had a policy position greater
than -.416. A low-valence candidate would have needed a policy position greater than -.2385. We
know from our estimates that Humphrey had high valence.
70The main democratic candidates in the 1972 primary elections were Humphrey, Muskie, Jack-
son, and Lindsay, candidates whose policy positions (apart from Lindsay’s) are respectively -.34,
—.328, and -.205. We do not have the policy position of Lindsay on a comparable scale since he
served the House of Representatives and not the Senate. However, looking at his coordinate on the
common-space model (Poole, 1998), where the coordinates of the members of the House of Repre-
sentatives and of the Senate are scaled on a common-space, we can claim that Lindsay had a policy
position conservative enough to allow him to defeat Nixon in 1972 (he switched party aﬃliation from
Republican to Democrat in 1972).
71See, e.g., White (1972) and Davis (1997).
35candidate.72 Also, simulation studies show that the process of selecting presidential
nominees in the U.S. is highly unpredictable.73 The new system favored the nomi-
nation of extremely liberal candidates who didn’t necessarily have a high valence.74
O u rr e s u l ti sa l s oi nl i n ew i t ht h ef a c tt h a tN i x o n ’ sc a m p a i g nf o rr e e l e c t i o ni n1 9 7 2
was eﬀective in inducing his strongest democratic opponents to drop out of the race.
In the second counterfactual experiment, we compare the realized electoral out-
comes in 1968 and 1972 with those corresponding to a scenario where all voters have
perfect information on candidates’ valence. The outcome of this experiment allows us
to assess the role played by asymmetric information in the electoral process. We ﬁnd
that while in 1972 McGovern would have still lost the election, in 1968 Humphrey
would have won.
Similarly, within the asymmetric information environment, we can assess the eﬀect
diﬀerent probabilities of being informed have on the electoral outcome. This is relevant
since parties can aﬀect such probabilities during a campaign. We do not need to
ﬁnd stories about Nixon and other Republicans aﬀecting the information during the
campaign.75 It is well known that since the beginning of his political career, Nixon
adopted the tactic of “discredit your opponent.”76 Two examples are the series of
“dirty tricks” played on Ed Muskie, the democratic front-runner in 1972 and Nixon’s
denigrating campaigning against McGovern in 1972.77
W h i l ew ec a n n o tﬁnd any combination of probabilities that would have helped
72See, e.g., Mueller (1989).
73See, e.g., Merril (1988) and Cooper and Munger (2000).
74See, e.g., Davis (1997).
75See White (1969, 1973) and Genovese (1990).
76New York Times, April 24, 1994.
77“In February of 1972, voters in New Hampshire, site of the ﬁrst primary, received late night
phone calls from people claiming to represent the ‘Harlem for Muskie Committee’ promoting the
candidacy of Muskie. . . .Shortly after the Florida primary, letters were mailed to Democrats on
stationary stolen from Muskies’ headquarters, with ‘vote for Muskie’ message and containing vicious
l i e s a b o u t M u s k i e s ’ D e m o c r a t i c o p p o n e n t s ....P e r h a p s t h e m o s t d a m a g i n g t r i c k o n M u s k i e
took place just prior to the New Hampshire primary. The conservative newspaper The Manchester
Union Leader published a letter signed by a Paul Morrison accusing Muskie of insulting Canadian-
Americans, calling them ‘Canucks’, and accusing Muskie’s wife of being an alchoolic who would
walk up and down the aisles of planes drunk, encouraging people to tell dirty jokes” Genovese (1990,
p.183).
36McGovern win the election in 1972, we do ﬁnd diﬀerent information structures that
would have made Humphrey win the election in 1968. For example, even if not fully
informed, had Republicans and Independents been more informed, Humphrey would
have been elected President in 1968. According to our estimates of the probabilities
of being informed, Republicans and Independents were more susceptible to the lack
of information. They voted for Nixon both because of his policy position and because
they did not think he was a low-valence politician.
Finally, we use our estimated model to make an observation regarding the so
called incumbency advantage. A large literature on incumbency advantage has been
developed based on the empirical observation that incumbent politicians have a higher
probability of being elected than new challengers. One possible explanation for such
an advantage is that, in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection, an eﬃcient
electoral process guarantees that good-quality (high-valence) politicians are elected
with a higher probability than bad quality (low-valence) ones.78 Another possible
explanation is that risk averse voters prefer to elect a known incumbent rather than
a new, and hence “more risky,” challenger.79 Our estimated model indicates that
although low-quality incumbents can be reelected, and can even win with a wider
margin than in the election in which they were ﬁrst appointed, it does not necessarily
follow that the incumbent has an advantage. In our model had Nixon not been
incumbent in 1972 but a new challenger with unknown valence, he would have won the
presidential election with a wider margin than he actually did.80 In fact in our model
a low-valence incumbent has a disadvantage, but despite this (as in 1972) he can be
reelected by a large margin. A high-valence incumbent has an advantage, but likewise
he may be defeated.81 Our ﬁnding that incumbents can have an advantage as well as a
78See Banks and Sundaram (1998). Ferejhon (1986) has a model with only moral hazard where
politicians who exert higher eﬀort have a higher probability of being reelected.
79See Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985).
80In our sample the voting share for Nixon in 1972 had he been a new challenger would have been
71.61% instead of the 66.11% that he received (in our sample) as an incumbent.
81When we apply our model to the 1976 and 1980 elections, we estimate Ford to have low valence
and both Carter and Reagan to have high valence. This is an example in which a high-valence
37disadvantage is in line with the results of the model proposed by Fiorina (1981) where
voters care about both the expected future policy of an elected politician and his past
record. Similar to our model where the incumbent has a disadvantage (advantage)
when he has low (high) valence, in his model the incumbent has a disadvantage
(advantage) when he has a bad (good) policy record.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we propose and estimate a dynamic model of voting with asymmetric
information incorporating the three main factors aﬀecting individual voting behavior:
policy preferences, candidates’ valence, and party identiﬁcation. The estimation is
based on a revealed preference approach. We use the structure of the model plus
individual-level data on voting choices in two consecutive elections to uncover funda-
mental utility parameters and other unobservable elements. In particular, we estimate
the distribution of voters’ policy positions, candidates’ valence, and the probability
of voters of being informed.
The estimated distribution of voters’ policy positions allows us to quantify the
eﬀect of demographic characteristics on voters’ policy preferences conditional on their
party identiﬁcation. Our results indicate the importance of party identiﬁcation to
the relationship between demographics and policy preferences. We ﬁnd that overall
Democrats’ policy preferences are more heterogeneous than Independents’, which in
turn are more heterogeneous than Republicans’, and that the aggregate distribution
of ideal points is relatively conservative.
Our estimates of valence indicate that Humphrey (the democratic candidate in
1968) had high valence, McGovern (the democratic candidate in 1972) had low va-
lence, and Nixon (the republican candidate in 1968 and again, as incumbent President,
in 1972) also had low valence. This result is perhaps surprising given that Nixon won
the 1968 election by a very small margin but went on to win the 1972 election by a
incumbent, Carter, is defeated.
38margin as large as that gained by Johnson in 1964 or Roosevelt in 1936. The results
are, however, consistent with anecdotal accounts of the events surrounding the 1968
and 1972 elections.
We estimate that Democrats have a higher probability of being informed than Re-
publicans who, in turn, have a higher probability of being informed than Independents
(68%, 29%, and 18% probability respectively).
We use the estimated candidates’ valence, voters’ probability of being informed,
and distribution of voters’ policy positions to provide an equilibrium interpretation
of the observed voting patterns and electoral outcomes. In addition, we use the esti-
mated model to conduct counterfactual experiments allowing us to assess the relative
importance of candidates’ policy positions, candidates’ valence, and voters’ informa-
tion on electoral outcomes as well as to evaluate the performance of the electoral
process.
First, we calculate the most liberal policy position that would have allowed a
high and a low-valence democratic candidate to win the elections in 1968 and in
1972 respectively. Then, we verify whether any of the democratic candidates at the
primary elections had the required policy position. We ﬁnd that while in 1968 none
of the democratic candidates participating in the democratic presidential primaries
could have defeated Nixon, virtually all of the participants in the 1972 democratic
primaries (other than McGovern) could have won the presidency. Second, we analyze
the eﬀect of asymmetric information on the outcome of the two elections and ﬁnd that
had all voters been aware of Nixon’s low valence, Humphrey would have been elected
President in 1968. Third, we provide an example where, although the incumbent
President is reelected, the incumbent has a disadvantage.
In this paper we have investigated individual voting behavior in consecutive elec-
tions for the same public oﬃce. The methodology we propose is quite general and
can be extended to address a variety of issues related to voting in multiple elections.
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448 Appendix A
As we did throughout the whole paper, we let z = λ(H − L). For any given group-
speciﬁc probability of being informed, distribution of ideal points, candidates’ posi-
tions in period 1, and proportion of voters in each group, it is possible to calculate the
expected vote shares in the ﬁrst period conditional on candidates’ valence. Because
within each party identiﬁcation we have a continuum of voters, and at each policy
point with positive mass there is a constant fraction of voters that becomes informed,
the actual vote share corresponding to the realization of any given state, in large
samples, is the same as the expected vote share conditional on the same state. Let
C1 =[ nd(1 − md)Yd(m1)+nr(1 − mr)Yr(m1)+ni(1 − mi)Yi(m1)]
T a b l eA . 1 .V o t es h a r e s
state at t=1 share π1
D
HH C1 +[ ndmdYd(m1 + z
2g1)+nrmrYr(m1 − z
2g1)+nimiYi(m1)]








LL C1 +[ ndmdYd(m1 − z
2g1)+nrmrYr(m1 + z
2g1)+nimiYi(m1)]







D(LH), we cannot say anything a priori about π1
D(HH)a n dπ1
D(LL).
However, these two shares will be diﬀerent except for the particular case in which
[ndmdYd(m1 + z
2g1)+nrmrYr(m1 − z
2g1)] = [ndmdYd(m1 − z
2g1)+nrmrYr(m1 + z
2g1)].
It follows that the state (and, more importantly, the incumbent’s type) is perfectly
revealed by the vote share with the only exception given by parameters satisfying the
above condition.
9 Appendix B
The 1972 CPS survey was conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the Insti-
tute for Social Research at the University of Michigan as part of a series of studies on
national elections produced by the political behavior program of the Survey Research
Center.
The survey was administered to 2705 respondents and contains 1070 variables.
The primary objective of this study was the analysis of the current attitudes and
voting patterns of a cross-section of American citizens. The respondents were sent
45questionnaires in two waves: the ﬁrst before the election (between September 1 and
November 6) and a second after the election (between November 7 and February
13).82 The number of respondents that have both a pre-election and a post-election
interview was 2285.
Of central interest for our analysis are the variables on voting choices in the 1968
and 1972 presidential elections. In the 1972 pre-election interview, respondents were
asked whether they voted in the 1968 national election and who they voted for in the
presidential election; analogous questions are asked in the post-election wave for the
1972 election.
In our analysis we concentrate on respondents who participated in both the 1968
and 1972 elections, who voted either for the republican or the democratic candidate,
and for whom we have information about their race, gender, age, region, education,
income, and party identiﬁcation.
Of the 2285 observations, the respondents who voted in both 1968 and 1972 num-
bered 1312. Table B.1 shows the extent of abstention in the initial sample. Only
1246 disclosed who they voted for. Of these, 1113 voted either for a republican or
democratic candidate in both elections. For 30 of them we have missing data on
individual characteristics. It follows that our ﬁnal sample has 1083 observations.
Table B.1. Abstention
1968\1972 vote 1972 abstain 1972 missing Total
vote 1968 1312 174 1 1487
abstain 1968 77 164 0 241
missing 273 283 1 557
Total 1662 621 2 2285
82In 1972 CPS survey respondents are given two types of forms. One part of respondents answer
to Form I and the other to Form II. There are two types of half samples. The ﬁrst type has some
respondents receiving Form I and others Form II in the pre-election interview. The second type has
the ﬁrst half receiving Form I and the second half receiving Form II in the pre-election inteview. In
the half-sample out-of-sample predictions (section 5.4) we use the second type.
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Table D.2. Prediction of aggregate static voting proﬁles on the second half sample
1968 Actual Predicted 1972 Actual Predicted
D 40.71 36.96 D 33.99 31.51




Table D.3. Prediction of dynamic voting proﬁles by pid on the second half sample
Proﬁles Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Party D Party D Party R Party R Party I Party I
DD 54.55 48.26 2.33 2.35 24.26 16.18
DR 20.71 22.26 2.33 2.00 11.76 13.15
RD 4.54 5.64 4.07 3.21 8.09 15.54
RR 20.20 23.85 91.28 92.44 55.88 55.13
nobs 198 198 172 172 136 136
X 2
(3) 3.362 0.5158 10.559









Table D.5. Prediction of aggregate static voting proﬁles on the ﬁrst half sample
1968 Actual Predicted 1972 Actual Predicted
D 38.47 41.83 D 33.80 35.78
R 61.53 58.17 R 66.20 64.22
X 2
(1) 2.674 X 2
(1) .987
Table D.6. Prediction of dynamic voting proﬁles by pid on the ﬁrst half sample
Proﬁles Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Party D Party D Party R Party R Party I Party I
DD 53.48 57.32 1.60 2.89 15.72 24.24
DR 19.57 18.96 2.66 1.50 13.21 12.03
RD 4.78 4.11 3.72 2.34 16.35 10.54
RR 22.17 19.61 92.02 93.26 54.72 53.18
nobs 230 230 188 188 159 159
X 2
(3) 1.6568 4.334 10.105









Table D.8. Prediction on GSS data: aggregate static voting proﬁles
1968 Actual Predicted 1972 Actual Predicted
D 45.28 43.40 D 37.89 38.18
R 54.72 56.60 R 66.11 61.82
X 2
(1) 0.925 X 2
(1) 0.0216
Table D.9. Prediction on GSS data: dynamic voting proﬁles by pid
Proﬁles Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Party D Party D Party R Party R Party I Party I
DD 65.78 60.63 0.51 2.98 22.03 21.00
DR 15.59 18.29 1.53 1.77 17.51 12.40
RD 4.18 4.38 2.04 3.10 7.34 12.83
RR 14.45 16.69 95.92 92.15 53.11 53.77
nobs 263 263 196 196 177 177
X 2
(3) 3.016 5.090 7.992
52Table D.10. Prediction of voting proﬁles of 1968-only voters
Proﬁles Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
All All PartyD PartyD PartyR PartyR PartyI PartyI
D 47.51 45.87 78.57 75.80 11.90 7.26 27.27 29.65
R 52.49 54.13 21.43 24.20 88.10 92.74 72.73 70.35
nobs 181 181 84 84 42 42 55 55
X 2
(1) 0.197 0.3527 1.348 0.1485
Table D.11. Prediction of voting proﬁles of 1972-only voters∗
Proﬁles Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
All All PartyD PartyD PartyR PartyR PartyI PartyI
D 40.71 36.91 58.79 54.96 9.30 10.69 35.33 28.90
R 59.29 63.09 41.21 45.04 90.70 89.31 64.67 71.10
nobs 452 452 199 199 86 86 167 167
X 2
(1) 2.801 1.180 0.173 3.36
∗Includes respondents that voted for Wallace in 1968
Table D.12. Prediction of voting proﬁles of voters who voted for Wallace in 196883
Proﬁles Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
All All PartyD PartyD PartyR PartyR PartyI PartyI
D 21.19 26.91 25.45 39.30 7.20 5.00 23.26 20.23
R 78.81 73.09 74.55 60.71 92.80 95.00 76.74 79.77
nobs 118 118 55 55 20 20 43 43
X 2
(1) 1.967 4.42 0.145 0.243
83Among the respondents for whom we know all individual characteristics, there are 118 who
voted for Wallace in 1968 and in 1972 voted for one of the two major parties’ candidates (only 3
voted for the independent candidate in 1972).
53